1.
That the US has adopted a more and more constricted view of the uses of
government is especially evident in the recent debate over a prescription drug
plan for the elderly. After bitter negotiations to reconcile the House and
Senate versions of the legislation, a bill was reported on November 17 to
Congress for a vote. If it passes, it will be the most expensive addition to
federal health care since the 1960s. Even so, at a projected cost of $400
billion over ten years, it is widely considered inadequate. Medicare, the
federal health plan for the elderly, now reimburses recipients almost
exclusively for drugs administered in hospitals. But the costs of outpatient
prescription drugs for the average Medicare beneficiary are reaching punitive
levels. Out-of-pocket costs are expected to rise from $644 a year in 2000 to
$1,454 in 2006. Even with $400 billion, the new legislation will reimburse only
about one third of the beneficiaries' total out-of-pocket drug costs,[1] and the program will not even begin until
2006. The current bill will also make it possible to impose a limit on future
increases in Medicare expenditures and create tax-free savings plans for
individuals to pay for private services.
In a clear sign of the times, the new federal program will be
administered privately. Both the plan originally passed by the House as well as
the Senate plan, backed by many Democrats, had the prescription drugs
distributed not by government but entirely by private insurance companies or
specialized drug distribution firms. Even Senator Edward Kennedy, long the
nation's leading defender of government-run social welfare, agreed to private
distribution for the drug plan.
In a different political atmosphere, Kennedy probably would not have
taken that position. The government could have administered the distribution of
drugs, for example, and reimbursed beneficiaries for their use; it could also
have used its buying power to negotiate lower prices for drugs instead of
leaving it to the free market. But given the prevailing ideology of the
Republicans in control of Congress, Kennedy believes that supporting private
distribution of drugs is the only way to get any drug bill for the elderly at
all, even if it allocates only half the funds he thinks necessary. "This
private-sector delivery system was not the Democrats' first choice, but it was
a reasonable compromise with a Republican Congress and a Republican
President," Kennedy has said. Some of his Democratic colleagues, such as
Senators Jay Rockefeller, John Kerry, and John Edwards, have refused to support
the plan. And Kennedy has said he will not vote for a bill that contains a
limit on future spending.
The intricacies of such legislative battles as the one concerning drugs
for the elderly have distracted Americans from recognizing the scale of change
that is now being proposed. Over the last twenty-five years, the attitude that
government is often more an impediment to economic growth and social justice
than a necessity has taken an ever-deeper hold in America. It is fair to say
that a battle to determine the future of America's traditional welfare state is
now underway. Always more modest than in Europe, the American "safety
net" includes Social Security, unemployment insurance, a minimum wage,
Medicare, poverty relief programs like welfare and Medicaid, industry
regulations, and at least some support for unionization.
Most of these programs were started during the New Deal and were
expanded in succeeding decades. They were painstakingly enacted into law in the
face of constant opposition from political opponents and private vested
interests. Since Ronald Reagan's presidency, they have been under effective
attack. Reagan narrowed the coverage of unemployment insurance significantly
and made benefits taxable. He refused to raise the minimum wage, even when
consumer prices were rising rapidly. He cut back welfare programs, eliminated
several hundred thousand public service jobs, deregulated industries, and
weakened unions.
Even under the Democratic president Bill Clinton, as the economist
Robert Pollin points out, total expenditures of the federal government fell
from 21.9 percent of the Gross Domestic Product in 1992 to 18.1 percent in
2000.[2] Military cutbacks made up a
large part of this reduction but there were also substantial cuts, as a
percentage of GDP, in transportation, education, and welfare. Clinton was
constantly battling a Republican Congress intent on further reductions and
eliminating some social programs outright, as well as partially privatizing
Social Security and Medicare. But his own preference was for a Third Way that
would be less dependent on government to guarantee social welfare. One of his
proudest achievements was the dismantling of the old federal welfare program by
placing time limits on benefits and imposing work requirements to qualify for
them.
Today, the Democratic candidates for president continue to argue over
who among them is the most profligate, even as they compete with one another to
promote the social programs that will have the most appeal to different groups
of voters. Joseph Lieberman, who claims to support the Third Way, criticizes
Howard Dean for being naively liberal with government money, while many of the
candidates have criticized Dean for supporting reduced Medicare spending in the
1990s. Dean often boasts of his balanced budget in Vermont, and criticizes
Congressman Richard Gephardt for promising social benefits like an old-style
Democrat. Wesley Clark has proposed the only federal program to create jobs
directly, costing some $50 billion, by giving tax incentives to employers.
During his presidency, Clinton himself considered partially privatizing
Social Security, which essentially meant that government would no longer
guarantee full benefits when people retire. Rather, workers would be
responsible for investing part of their payroll taxes in individual retirement
accounts. Judging by his recent eagerness to place the blame for such scandals
as Enron on Republicans in Congress, Clinton also seems to have forgotten how
much he deregulated the financial industry himself.
George Bush has vowed to cut back the new welfare program still further.
He has resisted the extension of unemployment insurance in the worst job market
since the Depression. He has refused to propose full funding for his own
federal education legislation, the much-publicized No Child Left Behind plan. Most
important, he has cut taxes so deeply that the nation will be unable to pay for
adequate new social programs, and very likely for existing ones. The federal
budget deficit will probably exceed $500 billion in the coming fiscal
year—nearly 5 percent of GDP. Reasonable projections suggest that when baby
boomers start to retire in roughly ten years, and the Social Security surplus
dissipates, budget deficits will still be high.
A second term for President Bush, plus continued control of both houses
of Congress by the Republicans, would likely mean that Social Security and
Medicare would be privatized—as Bush promised in his first presidential
campaign. We can also expect that Bush will strongly advocate providing private
vouchers for education and reducing the regulation of many industries, ranging
from natural gas to telecommunications.
We saw the true motives of the Bush administration when it decided,
under intense political pressure, to propose its own prescription drug plan for
the elderly last spring. Bush's original proposal made beneficiaries eligible
for new drug benefits only if they signed on to private programs. If they
stayed with traditional Medicare, they would receive no drug reimbursement
whatever. The administration has since backed off this proposal, but in a
second Bush term, it could be revived.
In fact, however, the new prescription drug bill for the elderly also
now includes a highly controversial plan to subsidize private health companies
to compete with traditional Medicare beginning in 2010. Even though the plan
will be tested in only six metropolitan areas, what began as a prescription
drug plan for the elderly has been turned into a major revision of the entire
Medicare program. Many experts say that the subsidies are designed to drive up
Medicare premiums above the cost of private programs, encouraging seniors to
abandon it. Senator Kennedy is adamantly opposed to this, but as of this
writing the House is holding to its position. "Privatizing the
longstanding Medicare benefits for hospital and doctor bills is very different
from a distribution system that makes use of the private sector," Kennedy
has said. "It's an unacceptable right-wing effort to undermine Medicare
and destroy a system that has served senior citizens well for almost forty
years. No elderly American should have to choose between the doctors they trust
and the medical care they need." Medicare, as we know it, he believes,
would be finished.
2.
One has to wonder how conscious the nation has been of the piecemeal but
steady destruction of the commitments to social welfare that the
US governments have made beginning a century ago. Many think of these
programs as the nation's greatest political achievement. It is true, however,
that the nation has become less trusting of government and more parsimonious
about social spending. To the extent that there is public discussion of a new
government approach to welfare, it has been dominated by slogans like the Third
Way and expressions of vehement anger toward government that have had several
disturbing sources. One source has been a nostalgic, over-simplified return to
America's individualistic national character—thus, we hear exhortations to
self-reliance and personal responsibility as social programs are cut. This
excerpt from the introduction to the libertarian Cato Institute's Handbook for
Congress in the 1990s is typical:
The "bourgeois virtues" of work, thrift, sobriety, prudence,
fidelity, self-reliance, and a concern for one's reputation developed and
endured in part because they are the virtues necessary for survival and
progress in a world where wealth must be produced and people are responsible
for their own flourishing. Government can't do much to instill these virtues in
people, but it can do much to undermine them.
Another source of anger toward the government has been a racially
prejudiced resistance to social programs that seemed designed to help
African-Americans in particular, even though the main beneficiaries of programs
like welfare are white Americans.
The political scientist Neil Gilbert, who teaches at the University of
California at Berkeley, has long been concerned with providing a clear,
consistent, and broad justification for advocating reduced government social
policies. He is often cited by proponents of this view as both a disciplined
observer and an enlightened advocate. He and his wife Barbara were authors in
1989 of a useful book, The Enabling State, which showed that the US had
already adopted a new conception of the role of government based on indirect
subsidies such as tax deductions for corporate pension and health care programs,
retirement savings programs like Individual Retirement Accounts and 401(k)s,
home mortgage interest, and tax credits for the working poor— the Earned Income
Tax Credit. When all those were added up, they argued, America's social
generosity was considerably greater than recognized.
Last year, Gilbert published Transformation of the Welfare State,
which, though objective in tone, essentially provides a theoretical
justification for replacing the old welfare systems with his "enabling
state," which is very close to the Cato Institute's own philosophy:
The protective blanket of the welfare state has become widely perceived
as smothering the vigorous virtues—initiative, diligence, commitment, fair
play, and enthusiasm —in the name of charity, patience, kindness, and sympathy.
From increasing the age of retirement to narrowing the criteria of disability,
from tax credits for the working poor to competitive bidding on social service
contracts, the norms and values that frame the design of social welfare policies
for the enabling state, in all its renditions, tend to celebrate economic
productivity and private responsibility over social protection and public aid.
In this new model of government, according to Gilbert, there is more
"steering than rowing." Citizens will take responsibility for
themselves through tax deductions and credits, thus avoiding the allegedly
debilitating dependencies created by generous, unrestricted government outlays.
Gilbert also, where possible, relies on the free market to distribute benefits
and create incentives to work, save, and invest. His enabling state is designed
to be efficient, keep taxes down, and thus presumably encourage work,
investment, and entrepreneurial activity.
Gilbert argues that even the Scandinavian countries, not to mention much
of continental Europe and of course Britain, are now discarding the old model
and moving toward the enabling state. The Scandinavians, he notes, famously
established the purest model of the traditional welfare state after World War
II. Benefits in the Scandinavian countries were and, to a large degree, still
are provided by direct government outlay, citizens are universally eligible for
them, and welfare is seen as a social right, not something to be earned or
limited. In general, the objective was to protect labor from the vicissitudes
of the market, whose ravages were fresh in the public mind after the Great
Depression.[3] As a matter of practice in Scandinavia and other
European countries, this has usually meant generous unemployment benefits,
retirement pensions, health care, income guarantees, market regulations, and
free or low-cost education.
All that is changing, however. Italy, Denmark, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands,
France, and Britain, Gilbert writes, have reduced their unemployment benefits
or narrowed the coverage. Norway has adopted work requirements for welfare
eligibility. Dutch governments have significantly tightened the requirements
for disability insurance. Sweden has partially privatized its public pensions
by setting aside a portion of payroll taxes for individual investment in
retirement accounts. Germany is considering a similar plan, and the World Bank
has advocated pension privatization.
But Gilbert admits that he may be overstating the case. Direct social
spending in such countries as Germany, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, and
Denmark remains around 30 percent of GDP, compared to only 17 percent of GDP in
the US.[4] Even in Britain, it is about 10 percent higher
than in the US.
Recognizing this, Gilbert argues that the OECD countries are replacing
direct social spending with tax-based programs, just as the US has been doing
for decades. These programs are at the heart of his idea of the enabling state
and, because they result in lost government tax revenues, many of them are
termed tax expenditures. In the US, such "private" social spending,
which includes tax deductions for corporate pension and health care benefits,
as well as individual retirement accounts and the Earned Income Tax Credit,
accounts for 35 percent of all social spending in the nation. It raises overall
social spending from 17 percent to 25 percent of GDP.
Gilbert points out that in Denmark, for example, similarly privatized or
indirect spending has quadrupled since 1980 as a proportion of all social
spending. Sweden's is up by more than 50 percent in this period. Britain's is
up 70 percent. But for all that increase, the proportion of overall social
spending remains far smaller than America's. In Denmark, these indirect
programs have risen from 1 percent to 4 percent of social spending, in Sweden
to 7 percent, and even in Britain, they amount to 17 percent. This hardly
supports Gilbert's point that the enabling state is fast becoming the accepted
model in Europe.
Nevertheless, both in action and in rhetoric, the old welfare state is
under challenge. Why is this so? Gilbert proposes several major causes.
In Europe, North America, and Japan, populations are aging. This is
putting pressure on workers to finance ever-greater public pensions and
expanding health and drug programs for the elderly.
Globalization, according to Gilbert, is forcing governments to cut
taxes and social benefits since investors prefer nations with lower business
costs.
There is increasing evidence that unconditional welfare policies
diminish the incentive to work. This idea was the foundation of America's
much-discussed welfare reform.
There is a renewed faith in private markets, which Gilbert attributes
to the failure of the Soviet Union and to the revival of neoclassical
economics, among other factors.
All these claims are familiar but they don't lead inevitably or even
desirably to an enabling state. Are reductions in social spending the only
effective response to globalization? Is increased faith in private markets
warranted by the evidence? Gilbert ignores the most important factor working
against welfare the sharp and completely unexpected slowdown in economic growth
across the developed world since the 1970s. This slowdown has resulted in much
lower GDP and worker incomes and hence reduced tax revenues than were expected
when welfare programs were created. Had the twenty-four OECD nations grown 1
percent a year faster beginning in the 1970s, which still would have been
considerably slower than their rates of growth in the 1950s and 1960s, taxes as
a proportion of GDP would not have risen to a forbidding average of 36.9
percent by 1995 no doubt creating political pressure on social programs. Had
Gilbert done some simple calculations, he would have found that the current
level of taxes would have come to less than 30 percent. He would have found
that it is not overgenerous social programs that are the problem so much as
disappointing economic growth.
One question about the new enabling state, then, is what it does to
encourage economic growth. Gilbert presents no evidence to support his
assertion that enabling states are more productive. He seems to assume that
America's economic boom in the late 1990s, and Europe's slow growth, is
argument enough that the American system is superior to the European welfare
state. The truth is considerably different. As the economists Joel Slemrod and
Jon Bakija convincingly show in Taxing Ourselves, there is, among the
OECD nations, no demonstrable relationship between the size of government and
economic growth or between the level of taxes and economic growth. The authors
show that attempts to prove this relationship simply do not hold up under
closer scrutiny.[5]
In Taxing Ourselves Slemrod and Bakija observe that while Sweden
has had slow economic growth in recent decades, Norway, a similarly high-tax
nation, has grown rapidly. Between 1970 and 1990, the United States grew slowly
but a similarly low-tax nation such as Japan grew rapidly; in the 1990s, the
reverse was true. In the early 2000s, we now see, low-tax America could not
create more jobs, wages have been falling across the board, and the proportion
of poor people has again risen sharply.
How can it be that the size of government has so little impact on
economic growth? For one thing, the economy is probably more responsive to
factors such as new commercial technologies, new products, and rapidly growing
markets than to deterrence from taxes or relatively high levels of government
spending. For another, claims made by well-known economists such as Martin
Feldstein, former chairman of President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers,
that high taxes discourage people from working hard and investing more have not
held up. Clinton's tax increases in 1992, which Feldstein and others warned
would reduce incentives to work and invest, helped or at the least did not
impede the economic boom of the late 1990s.
Finally, as Slemrod and others note, the state often spends money in
ways that benefit economic growth. Public investment in education,
transportation, and other infrastructure sustains economic growth. Programs
that help maintain income can at times also support growth by keeping up demand
for goods and services. Government spending also contributes to political and
economic stability and confidence in the functioning of private markets.
Neil Gilbert also implies that free markets will generally be more
efficient at distributing services than direct government spending. No doubt,
this is sometimes true, but by no means is it a universal rule. Consider the
demand for further privatization of Medicare. Through competition and increased
efficiency, privatization would supposedly hold down Medicare costs, which are
expected to rise more rapidly than for any other major program over the next
thirty years. But as the economists Marilyn Moon and Cristina Boccuti point out
in a study for the Urban Institute, spending by private insurers per person has
risen 20 percent faster than spending by Medicare since 1970. In a market as
complex as health care, with information both scarce and hard to decipher for
the average consumer, some regulation and standardization is often useful.
It is true that welfare programs encourage some people to avoid work. But
the extent of such effects are usually exaggerated. Clinton's reforms, Gilbert
notes, significantly reduced the number of people receiving welfare from more
than five million in 1994 to fewer than three million when he left office. Many
of these welfare recipients are now working and few would now argue that
welfare should not have been reformed at that time. Work requirements, if not
too strict, were generally desirable, particularly if they took account of the
needs of mothers with young children. But the experiment, as Gilbert points
out, also took place in a strong job market. Moreover, a large proportion of
those who left the welfare rolls still live at or near official poverty levels.
In short, welfare reform needs itself to be reformed, as Amitai Etzioni writes
in a foreword to Gilbert's book, because it has gone too far:
Throwing mental patients, alcoholics, mothers with small children, or
anyone else onto the streets and cutting off their benefits is not compatible
with treating all people as ends in themselves.
Bush wants to make welfare still tougher.
Gilbert, for his part, utterly ignores the rising inequality of incomes
that have accompanied the enabling state. It is no small irony that in America
in particular, the leading "enabling" state in the world, incomes and
wealth have become much more unequal over the last thirty years. The number of
Americans without health insurance has risen to more than 40 million;
educational quality is highly unequal as well, and in many urban neighborhoods
utterly inadequate. Child poverty remains the worst among the OECD nations
while measures of health, such as infant mortality, though improved, are still
near the bottom among advanced nations. For most workers, moreover, wages have
fallen, stagnated, or grown at historically slow rates, and a huge proportion
of African-American men are now in prison. Meanwhile, the rapidly rising costs
of education, health care, public transit, and drugs have made life much harder
for middle-income families. Gilbert discusses none of this in adequate detail.
3.
In his new book, The Divided Welfare State, Jacob S. Hacker, a
Yale University political scientist, analyzes how the United States' increasing
reliance on private welfare has further scaled back what were already the
least-generous social services in the developed world. Americans, he suggests,
are largely unaware of this. The United States, he notes, "is the only
affluent capitalist country that does not guarantee universal or near-universal
health insurance," yet
the litany of complaints that flood today's headlines and airwaves
suggests just the opposite: that government is too big, overbearing, and
expensive; that it does too much at too high a cost and does it badly.
Tax deductions for corporate pension and health care benefits alone
result in lost federal tax revenues of $200 billion a year. But only about 16
percent of workers with earnings in the bottom quintile of the nation the
lowest 20 percent receive pension benefits, and only 24 percent receive health
benefits. By contrast, some 50 percent of workers in the third quintile receive
pension benefits and 60 percent health benefits. In the top quintile, roughly
70 percent of workers receive pension and health benefits.
Similarly, the tax deduction for home mortgage interest, amounting to
more than $50 billion of lost tax revenues, is tilted toward the well-off. IRAs
and 401(k)s, which provide tax deductions for voluntary retirement savings,
also favor the better-off, especially as corporations replace defined benefit
plans, which provided pensioners a set income each year, with plans requiring
pensioners to invest on their own, for better or worse. [6] This is regressive social policy in
the extreme. The Earned Income Tax Credit is one of the programs for tax
benefit that reduce inequality, but it is a decided exception. As Hacker points
out, there is a close correlation between privatizing social spending and
income inequality in the nations of the OECD.
The case for reforming the traditional welfare state should rest on
better arguments than those that have so far prevailed. Two concerns remain
undeniable. First, aging populations present a serious challenge to all
developed nations. There will inevitably be significantly fewer workers
relative to pensioners in coming decades unless nations encourage significantly
more immigration of young workers. The elderly will be living longer as well,
as geriatric medicine becomes more advanced and therefore more expensive. Second,
slow economic growth is reducing the tax revenues available for social welfare.
People will naturally resist paying more taxes unless they believe social
programs are just and benefit most of the population.
There are more imaginative and effective responses to these changes,
however, than the enabling state praised by Gilbert. Consider the future of
Social Security. Robin Blackburn, who was the editor of the New Left Review
for years and is a professor at both New York's New School University and the
University of Essex, differs from many of his liberal colleagues in his
approach to the aging population. While he acknowledges that many observers
have exaggerated the future costs of Social Security, he maintains in his new
book, Banking on Death, that these costs are forbidding enough that it
is imperative to start saving right now to meet them. But he would do this
collectively, not through privatization. Privatization, he argues, will create
still further inequality; the poorer worker will have a harder time investing
his or her privatized pension, and many will invest badly.
Blackburn sees the solution in an enlightened government program of
pre-funding, a program similar to those advocated by some moderately liberal
American economists, like Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institution. The Social
Security system will eventually have a deficit each year (unless the nation's
economy grows much faster) as payments to retirees exceed income from payroll
taxes when the baby boomers retire. But right now, because of the baby boom,
many more workers pay payroll taxes than collect benefits, producing a surplus
that is being used by the Bush administration to meet the other expenses of the
federal government. If the surplus is set aside and invested in equities and
bonds, the nation could more readily meet its future obligations. In the 2000
campaign Al Gore promised to set aside the surplus, as did George Bush, if less
emphatically. Instead, the Bush administration is simply using the surplus to
close the budget gap, as has been the case for years now.
Blackburn would not stop there, however, as advocates of pre-funding
usually do. He reminds workers that Wall Street and the big banks now invest
the tens of billions of dollars in their pension funds and other savings in the
private economy as they see fit. Recent performance suggests that they often do
not do this wisely. He believes these funds should be used to support
collective investment in better mass transit and other infrastructure, as well
as education and other public goods that would stimulate economic growth. One
possibility, he argues, is to have private pensions buy government bonds whose
proceeds would be set aside specifically for such public purposes. There are
already examples of such arrangements in other countries.
Blackburn's views seem to me refreshing. His book is not only an
excellent comprehensive history of social security programs in the developed
world. It acknowledges that there are real strains on the old welfare state and
proposes interesting ways to handle them that do not resort automatically to
simplistic formulas of privatization.
The nation badly needs such an open debate over its public purposes, not
the narrow arguments we have been hearing in favor of the enabling state or a
Third Way. Liberals, for example, should acknowledge that labor should be
willing to accept new technologies and retraining and that high payroll taxes
and corporate benefits can inhibit investment in new business ventures. But
instead of cutting back Social Security benefits, we might provide fully
portable pension and health care benefits that workers could take from job to
job and use to protect them from the more erratic job market and global
competition. We might reduce payroll taxes to encourage corporations to hire
more people. The loss of revenue could be made up by raising corporate income
taxes or the personal income taxes paid by more prosperous citizens.
Similarly, workers might be more tolerant of free trade if we better
protected the unemployed. The beneficiaries of capital flows around the world
are often Wall Street companies, such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, that
provide financial services. Those companies could pay higher taxes in order to
support workers who suffer job losses as a result of globalization; they would
benefit at the same time by increasingly liberalized capital and trade flows.
Finally, perhaps the biggest question the US should face is whether it
is capable of seriously considering a single-payer federal health insurance
system to cover all Americans. Such a system is not perfect but works
reasonably well at a significantly lower cost per patient in Canada and other
countries. The inefficient hybrid system we now have is so costly that it could
eventually ruin the economy.
Contrary to the promises of its advocates, the enabling state neither
automatically promotes economic growth nor enhances the social welfare. It
appeals to voters who think their taxes will go down and to powerful
corporations who think they will make greater profits from presiding over an
increasingly privatized welfare system. The nation has on the whole been worse
off as a result.
November 17, 2003
Notes
[1] The original House and Senate versions
differed substantially. In the new compromise bill, the government would pay 75
percent of all out-of-pocket drug costs up to an annual maximum of $2,200 after
a deductible of $275 and a monthly fee of $35. It would pay nothing again until
annual out-of-pocket costs reach $3,600, after which it would pay 95 percent of
the remainder.
[2] Robert Pollin, Contours of
Descent: US Economic Fractures and the Landscape of Global Austerity
(Verso, 2003), p. 29.
[3] As summed up by the British sociologist T.H.
Marshall: "The market value of an individual cannot be the measure of his
right to welfare." See T.H. Marshall, "Value Problems of Welfare
Capitalism," Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1972,
pp. 19–20; quoted by Neil and Barbara Gilbert in The Enabling State
(Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 4.
[4] See the most recent survey by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
[5] In a paper reviewed by his peers for the
Brookings Institution, Slemrod carefully worked through the existing analyses
to show how tentative they were. For a comprehensive and more technical summary
see Joel Slemrod, "What Do Cross-Country Studies Teach About Government
Involvement, Prosperity, and Economic Growth?" Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, No. 2 (1995), pp. 373–431.
[6] For the disturbing consequences, see Edward N.
Wolff, Retirement Insecurity: The Income Shortfalls Awaiting the
Soon-to-Retire (Economic Policy Institute, 2002).
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